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FACTS
On the evening of May 8, 2002, Christine Crandall, a white female,
was approached and threatened at gunpoint by two black men requesting that
she relinquish her car keys.1 Although the alleged perpetrators walked away
after Crandall's neighbor called the police, Crandall was able to describe the
men to the authorities.2 The police were unable to locate the two men.3
When Crandall was brought into the Baltimore City police station for
questioning two days later, she did not recognize any of the men in the photo
line-ups prepared by the police.4 Two weeks after the incident, Crandall
returned to the police station to examine newly prepared photo arrays, at
which time she identified Jason Mack as the man who held the gun and
James Smith as the man who tried to take her car keys from her.5 Based on
Crandall's identifications, both men were arrested and charged with
attempted armed robbery, 6 first and second degree assault,7 carrying a
handgun and use of a handgun in commission of a crime,8 and attempted
theft.9
In pretrial proceedings, the trial judge denied Smith's motion in
limine requesting that the jury be instructed on cross-racial eyewitness
identification, 10 which would allow the parties to raise the issue in opening
statements." During direct examination at trial, Crandall stated that at the
time of the assault, she was able to observe both men and was able to
describe their clothing and other physical features.' 2  In addition to her
identification testimony, Crandall stated that she was sure these two men





6 Id.; see MD. CODE ANN., Criminal Law § 3-402 (2005) ("A person may not commit or attempt
to commit robbery.").
7 See MD. CODE ANN., Criminal Law § 3-202 ("(1) A person may not intentionally cause or
attempt to cause serious physical injury to another. (2) A person may not commit an assault with a
firearm."); see also id. at § 3-203 ("A person may not commit an assault.").
See id. at § 4-203 ("A person may not wear, carry, or transport a handgun, whether concealed
or open, on or about the person."); see also id. at § 4-204 ("A person may not use an antique firearm
capable of being concealed on the person or any handgun in the commission of a crime of violence.").
9 See id. at § 7-104 ("A person may not willfully or knowingly obtain or exert unauthorized
control over property.").
10 Smith, 880 A.2d at 289 n.1.
I d. at 291.
12 Id.
12 WASH. & LEEJ. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 2 (2006)
were the defendants because she was "extremely good with faces.'' 13 On
cross-examination, defense counsel did not ask specific questions relating to
cross-racial identification. 14  During a recess, the judge denied defense
counsel's request to mention the difficulties of cross-racial identification
during closing arguments because the defendant had not entered this
information as facts in evidence. 15 The judge allowed defense counsel to
state the fact that the defendant is black while the victim is white, but both
parties declined to do so.'
6
The trial court found Smith guilty of attempted robbery, second
degree assault, and attempted theft. A separate sentencing hearing merged
the assault and attempted theft convictions. 7 Smith received a six-year
prison sentence with all but two years suspended along with three years of
probation for the attempted robbery conviction.18 The Maryland Court of
Special Appeals affirmed the judgment, finding that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in declining to give a jury instruction concerning cross-
racial identification.19 In its opinion, the court repeated the trial judge's
reasoning that no evidence was presented at trial to show that race played a
part in Crandall's identification or that cross-racial identification was an
issue.20 The intermediate appellate court noted that the trial court was
correct in prohibiting discussion of cross-racial identification in closing
arguments since that was not within the evidence adduced at trial.21 It
mentioned that statements concerning the defendant or victim's race were
permissible since these were matters of "common knowledge," and the jury
was allowed to draw reasonable inferences from these matters.27
HOLDING
In a 4-3 decision, the Maryland Court of Appeals, the highest state
court, reversed the defendants' convictions and vacated their sentences,
13 See id. at 292 (stating that during direct examination, Crandall replied that she was "extremely
good with faces" when asked how she was sure that the defendants were the two people that had tried to
rob her). The trial transcript further quotes Crandall as saying, "I am a teacher and I watch lay
mannerisms... I'm obsessed with people's postures and the way you'[re] looking [at] them and seeing
what's going on .... And so, I think [of] myself [as] very, very good with people. [I] study faces and I
have, I look for features on people that make them more distinct." Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.








holding that under the circumstances of this case, the trial judge erred in
precluding the defendants from discussing cross-racial identification in
closing arguments.23  Since the court found the trial court and the
intermediate appellate court in error on the matter of closing arguments, it
did not reach the question of whether the trial judge should have given a jury
instruction on cross-racial identification. 24
ANALYSIS
In evaluating whether the trial judge erred in precluding defense
counsel from discussing the difficulties of cross-racial identification in his
closing argument, the court mostly relied on scientific research. 25 "Own-race
bias" is the tendency for some witnesses to be better able to identify
members of their own race while having significant problems trying to
identify members of another race.26 Almost all of the studies concerning this
phenomenon have, been conducted in a laboratory setting, with results
showing that white participants have the greatest identification difficulty
with black faces.27 Only three published field studies have examined the
cross-racial effect, and although they seem to support the theory that some
witnesses are more likely to misidentify members of other races than their
own, the variations in the studies leave inconclusive results.28
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 294.
26 Id.; see Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth A. Olson, The Other-Race Effect in Eyewitness
Identification: What Do We Do About It?, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 230, 230 (2001) (discussing that
the difficulty of other-race facial recognition relative to own-race facial recognition in eyewitness
identification is highly relevant to the criminal justice system).
27 Smith, 880 A.2d at 295; see P. Barkowitz & John Brigham, Recognition of Faces: Own Race
Bias, Incentive, and Time Delay, 12 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 255, 261 (1982) (stating that the own-race
effect is strongest when white participants attempt to recognize black faces); see also Roy S. Malpass &
Jerome Kravitz, Recognition for Faces of Own and Other Race, 13 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
330, 330-34 (1969) (reporting that in a laboratory setting, white subjects misidentified black faces two-to-
three times more often than they misidentified white faces).
28 Smith, 880 A.2d at 296; see John C. Brigham et al., Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications in
a Field Setting, 42 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 673, 681 (1982) (reporting that when convenience
store clerks were later asked to identify customers, black participants had an overall higher accuracy
percentage and white participants misidentified black customers 36.3% more than white customers);
Stephanie J. Platz & Harmon M. Hosch, Cross-Racial/Ethnic Eyewitness Identification: A Field Study, 18
J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 972, 977-78 (1988) (reporting that white convenience store clerks correctly
identified white customers at a higher rate than both black and Hispanic customers and Hispanic clerks
were better able to identify Hispanic customers than white or black customers); Daniel B. Wright,
Catherine E. Boyd & Colin G. Tredoux, Eyewitness Identification: A Field Study of Own-Race Bias in
South Africa and England, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 119, 119 (2001) (reporting that in South Africa
and England, both black and white participants displayed a cross-race effect when attempting to identify
photos of individuals whom they had seen in a lineup earlier).
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Since the majority of these studies have been conducted in a
laboratory setting and the field studies have been rather sterile, researchers
disagree on the extent to which own-race bias affects eyewitness
identification at an actual crime scene.29  This disagreement has caused
scientists to question whether courts should recognize the difficulties with
cross-racial identification in cases where the defendant and witness are of
different races. 30  The Maryland Court of Appeals lists six cases from other
jurisdictions where courts have allowed jury instructions or closing
arguments based on cross-racial identification as evidence that some courts
find the evidence of this trend persuasive enough to allow discussion of this
phenomenon in the courtroom.
3 1
In examining the permissible scope of closing arguments guaranteed
through the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel, the court notes that closing
arguments can contain any comment on the evidence, inferences that may be
drawn from such evidence, attacks on the character or credibility of the
witnesses, and reminders of matters of common knowledge.32  The court
relied on the third element in deciding that the trial judge should have
allowed comments on cross-racial identification in closing arguments.
Crandall's identification of the defendants is the only significant piece of
evidence linking the defendants to the crime, and due to Crandall's remarks
29 Smith, 880 A.2d at 296-97; see Siegfried Ludwig Sporer, The Cross-Race Effect: Beyond
Recognition of Faces in the Laboratory, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 170, 173 (2001) (discussing how
variations in statistical data lead different researchers to different conclusions about the extent to which
own-race bias affects identification); Wells & Olson, supra note 18, at 230 (stating that the legitimacy of
the results of laboratory and field studies as applied to "real-world" situations is a point of contention
among researchers).
30 Smith, 880 A.2d at 298; see, e.g., John P. Rutledge, They All Look Alike: The Inaccuracy of
Cross-Racial Identifications, 28 Am. J. Crim. L. 207, 215 (2001) (discussing that the denial of a defense
request for a special jury instruction regarding the difficulties with cross-racial identification is usually
upheld on appeal as within the trial court's discretion unless the identification is the critical issue in the
case and the circumstances of the case raise doubts about the reliability of the identification).
31 Smith, 880 A.2d at 298; see People v. Carrieri, 777 N.Y.S.2d 627, 629 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004)
(permitting a defendant's closing argument on cross-racial identification and stating that the quality of
cross-racial witness identification fell within the ambit of jurors' general knowledge and life experience);
see also State v. Wiggins, 813 A.2d 1056, 1059 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003) (stating that "closing argument
may be employed to demonstrate the problems that might arise as a result of cross-racial identification");
State v. Cromedy, 727 A.2d 457, 467-68 (N.J. 1999) (allowing jury instruction on cross-racial
identification and stating that there is a "widely held commonsense view that members of one race have
greater difficulty in accurately identifying members of a different race"); People v. Sanders, 905 P.2d
420, 435 (Cal. 1995) (holding that the defendant had not been prejudiced by the trial court's refusal of
expert testimony on eyewitness identification because defense counsel had been allowed to argue the
problems of cross-racial identification in closing argument); State v. Cunningham, 863 S.W.2d 914, 923
(Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (noting that counsel may discuss the problems with cross-racial identification in
closing argument); State v. Patterson, 405 S.E.2d 200, 207 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991) (upholding defendant's
conviction based upon eyewitness identification and noting that defense counsel had been allowed to
argue the difficulties of cross-racial identification in closing argument).
32 Smith, 880 A.2d at 299; see Wilhelm v. State, 326 A.2d 707, 728 (Md. 1974) (discussing the
scope of permissible closing argument).
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about her enhanced ability to identify faces, the jury might have put more
weight on her identification than if she had not qualified her experience.33
The court states that it "cannot state with certainty that difficulty in cross-
racial identification is an established matter of common knowledge," but
comments upon the difficulties of such should be allowed here to counter
Crandall's self-described enhanced abilities.34 The trial court erred in not
allowing comments on cross-racial identification during closing arguments.
DISSENTING OPINION
Judge Harrell, joined by Judges Wilner and Greene, dissents from
the majority because he believes it was within the trial judge's discretion to
disallow discussion of cross-racial identification in closing arguments.36
Judge Harrell agrees that the difficulties associated with cross-racial
identification are not common knowledge. 37 However, he does not think that
Crandall's supposed enhanced ability to identify faces is related to cross-
racial identification to the extent that it could be used to attack her
credibility.38 He also notes that, while inferences can be drawn from the
evidence during closing arguments, the defense never admitted evidence
about cross-racial identification difficulties during trial.39
Furthermore, Judge Harrell examines the cases cited by the majority
in a different light.40  He points out that on the issue of cross-racial
identification, some of the cited cases were from other jurisdictions, were
unpersuasive, or dealt with the issue peripherally in dicta.41 Some of the
cases go so far as to say that cross-racial eyewitness identification alone is
insufficient for cautionary jury instructions.
4 2
According to Judge Harrell, arguments concerning cross-racial
identification are not necessarily appropriate in every case where the




37 Id. at 302.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 301.
40 Id. at 302.
41 Id. at 302-03.
42 Id.; see Cunningham, 863 S.W.2d at 923 (discussing that arguments concerning cross-racial
identification difficulties might only be allowed when the evidence has shown the specific impact that
such identification has on that case); Wiggins, 813 A.2d at 1059 (stating that jury instructions or closing
arguments regarding cross-racial identification difficulties are not appropriate in every case to which they
could potentially relate); Cromedy, 727 A.2d at 467 ("The simple fact pattern of a white victim of a
violent crime at the hands of a black assailant would not automatically give rise to the need for a cross-
racial identification charge.").
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defendant and victim are of different races.43 He points out that the court
seems to grant automatic permission to argue these difficulties, as well as the
fact that such a position has not been supported in prior case law.44  If the
court were to keep this rule of inherent suspicion in any cross-racial
identification, Judge Harrell believes there would be "severe and limitless
implications" that the majority did not contemplate.45 Judge Harrell's
primary concerns are that there is no description of which factors would be
relevant, no definition of "races," and no legal analysis of whether the
findings of this scientific research is credible enough to be admissible in
court.
4 6
The court has not properly considered the implications of this
decision, and thus the rule set out by the majority is more prejudicial than
probative in regards to cross-racial identification evidence. 7 The trial judge
did not abuse her discretion by not allowing counsel to discuss cross-racial
identification difficulties in closing arguments.48
CONCLUSION
The 4-3 decision in Smith v. State shows the contentious nature of
the use of cross-racial identification in legal proceedings. Because the trend
in studies on this issue confirms the difficulties associated with cross-racial
identification,49 the majority's decision to allow discussion of these
difficulties is understandable as a policy matter. However, the majority
mostly relied on psychological studies and the case law it mentioned does
not bear directly on the issue of whether cross-racial identification
difficulties are a valid counter-argument to attack a witness's enhanced
ability to identify faces.50 The dissent points out that in a number of the
43 Smith, 880 A.2d at 304.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 304-05. The court suggests a Frye-Reed or Daubert analysis before the results of this
psychological research is allowed in court. Id. In Frye v. United States, the court announced that in
admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing
from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in
the particular field in which it belongs. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). In
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Supreme Court decided that in regards to expert
testimony, a trial judge must make a "preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology
underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can
be applied to the facts in issue." Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93
(1993).
47 Smith, 880 A.2d at 305.
48 Id. at 306.
49 See supra text accompanying note 27; see also supra text accompanying note 28.
50 See generally Smith, 880 A.2d at 298; see also FED. R. EVID. 608 (stating that a witness's
credibility can be attacked during direct examination by opinion and reputation testimony and during
cross examination by testimony concerning specific instances of conduct).
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cases cited by the majority, the various courts state that the trial judge has
discretion to decide whether cross-racial identification difficulties can be
mentioned at trial because the veracity of these difficulties has not been
sufficiently proven.5' If the dissent's application of these cases is correct, the
trial judge's belief that these difficulties should not be argued was within her
discretion given the jury confusion that could result from trying to weigh this
information with the totality of the evidence. 2
The court justifies the discussion of difficulties with cross-racial
identification in closing arguments by limiting its approval to the certain
circumstance when the witness qualifies her identification abilities.53  It is
this qualification that gives the defense the opportunity to counter her
abilities via discussion of cross-racial identification difficulties.54 In People
v. McDonald,55 the prosecution relied heavily on eyewitness identification in
its case against the defendant, just as the prosecution had in Smith.56
However, the California Supreme Court did not even go so far as Smith's
qualification threshold in holding that cross-racial identification testimony is
allowed when eyewitness identification is so crucial to the prosecution's case
that it will weigh heavily in the jury's deliberations.57 In this situation, it is
an abuse of the trial judge's discretion not to allow the defendant's expert to
comment on this identification.58 The exclusion of testimony attacking the
accuracy of the eyewitness identifications "undercut[s] the evidentiary basis
of defendant's main line of defense" and "deprive[s] the jurors of




Crandall's identification of the defendants was similarly vital to the
prosecution's case in Smith v. State, and precluding the defense from
commenting on such, especially given her qualification of her identification
abilities, constituted an abuse of discretion.
51 See Smith, 880 A.2d at 303 (discussing how dialogue concerning cross-racial identification
difficulties is not always appropriate and the trial judge is the final decision-maker about whether any
topic or piece of evidence will be proper for the jury consideration).
52 Id. at 304.
53 Id. at 300.
5 Id.
55 People v. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d 351 (1984). In McDonald, the California Supreme Court
considered if the trial judge abused his discretion in excluding expert witness testimony concerning
various psychological factors affecting the accuracy of eyewitness testimony. Id. at 355. In McDonald, a
capital case, the prosecution's only evidence was the identifications of seven eyewitnesses, all of different
races than the defendant. Id. The trial judge excluded a psychologist's expert testimony on problems
with cross-racial eyewitness identification because it would confuse the jury and would be a personal
attack on the individual witnesses. Id. at 362-63. The McDonald Court found this exclusion to be an
abuse of discretion, as the testimony presented essential information which may have been necessary for
the triers of fact to determine the reliability of the seven eyewitnesses. Id. at 366-70.
56 Id. at 355.
57 Id. at 375-76.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 376.
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Due to the developing evidentiary difficulties with eyewitness
identification, not all courts agree on the pervasive acceptance of cross-racial
identification evidence as set out in People v. McDonald.6° Some courts
claim that McDonald's rule has not been widely followed, while others insist
that the trial judge's discretion will rarely be found an abuse as long as she
considers the totality of the circumstances. 6' As recently as 2002, the
Supreme Court of New York County held that expert psychological
testimony regarding different aspects of eyewitness identification was
inadmissible because the relevant information was not generally accepted in
62the relevant psychological community. Conversely, the Utah Supreme
Court has gone so far as to declare eyewitness identification suspect in all
circumstances, making it a subject always appropriate for cautionary jury
instructions.63
Nation-wide disagreement on how to treat cross-racial eyewitness
identification evidence supports the dissent's conclusion that the trial judge
could not have abused her discretion no matter how she ruled. However, the
specific circumstances of this case demand that the majority's rule be
exercised. Crandall's allegedly enhanced identification is the prosecution's
critical piece of evidence, and the defendant must have the best opportunity
to rebut that identification. 64 The ruling of the Maryland Court of Appeals
60 See State v. Lawhom, 762 S.W.2d 820, 822-23 (Mo. 1988) (holding that expert testimony
regarding difficulties associated with cross-racial identification is inadmissible because it is within the
common experience of the jurors and would only divert the jury's attention from relevant issues). The
Lawhorn Court disregards McDonald but states its rule that "where (1) identification is a key element of
the prosecution's evidence, (2) the guilt of the accused is not substantially corroborated by other evidence,
and (3) the evidence by a qualified expert would supply information not likely to be known to the jury," it
is an abuse of the trial court's discretion not to admit such evidence. Id.; see also People v. Beaver, 725
P.2d 96, 99-100 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that the trial court properly excluded expert testimony
and jury instructions concerning reliability of cross-racial eyewitness identification because the testimony
would not have aided the jury in resolution of the ultimate issue and the jury instructions did not affect a
substantial right).
61 See Lawhom, 762 S.W.2d at 822 ("McDonald [has not] been widely followed"); State v.
Stilling, 770 P.2d 137, 143 (Utah 1989) (discussing that in the past, trial judges had complete discretion to
give cautionary jury instructions under the totality of the circumstances, and the judge's decision was
seldom declared an abuse of discretion on appeal).
62 See People v. LeGrand, 747 N.Y.S.2d 733, 744-51 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002) (discussing how a
Frye analysis led the court to conclude that none of the phenomena to which the expert would testify had
received general acceptance in the psychological community).
63 See State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 492 (Utah 1986) (holding that trial courts must give
cautionary jury instructions whenever eyewitness identification is a central issue in the case and such an
instruction is requested by the defense because of the great weight jurors give to eyewitness testimony and
the unknown flaws of such).
64 See McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d at 377 (holding that when an eyewitness identification is a key
element of the prosecution's case and the defendant offers testimony on psychological factors outside
jurors' common experience affecting the accuracy of the identification, "it will ordinarily be error to
exclude that testimony"); Long, 721 P.2d at 492 ("A proper instruction should sensitize the jury to the
factors that empirical research have shown to be of importance in determining the accuracy of eyewitness
identifications, especially those that laypersons most likely would not appreciate.").
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will be upheld because the excluded cross-racial identification information is
vital for the defendant to present his best defense and successfully refute the
prosecution's strongest evidence.
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